

The effect of exposure to democratic institutions on tolerance: Brazil compared with other Latin American countries

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1 Introduction

Democracy theorists generally argue that even well planned political institutions are not enough to ensure the smooth functioning and stability of a democratic regime (Sullivan and Transue, 1999). It is necessary that citizens share a political culture compatible with democracy. A working democracy requires that a large majority of citizens accept that frequently those holding political power will represent the interests of other citizens. Hence, tolerance towards people of different values is necessary to bear staying long periods in the opposition. The higher the tolerance to ethnic diversity and to other identity features that distinguish people, the more stable democracy is expected to be.

The understanding of what makes people more tolerant is important to a more comprehensive explanation of processes of democratic consolidation. High levels of social intolerance might be a warn signal that the health of democracy is not good, and a breakdown is possible. My objective in this paper is to contribute to this understanding by testing whether exposure to democratic institutions foster social tolerance.

According to Sullivan et al. (1981, p. 93), citizens have different levels of political participation, and those who participate more are decisive for defining the political features of the society. When the most participative citizens support democratic principles, including tolerance, the society can afford relatively high levels of intolerance among common citizens. However, we should note that after the emergence of social media this might no longer be the true. Common people today can manifest their opinion and congregate much more easily than in the past, when a centralized organization, such as a political party was required to coordinate the actions of the mass of dispersed citizens. That is, the understanding of how people become tolerant is increasingly important.

2 Tolerance

To tolerate is to allow somebody to act in a way that is considered to be less than adequate or even plainly wrong. A person tolerates someone else when he or she allows the other to do something that he or she disagrees. The problem is to define what should be tolerated and what should be forbidden (Gibson, 2006, p. 22). Democracy requires a great deal of tolerance, but not unlimited tolerance. In a democratic regime most laws (ideally it would be all laws) reflect the will of the people, and they must be obeyed. There is a great degree of freedom of behaving: everything that is not forbidden by law is allowed. But some people may find some lawful behavior immoral and will prefer to avoid contact with people that behave in such a way. In some cases, this might be considered intolerance. But extreme tolerance will not be good for democracy either if it reaches a level of lawlessness (Gibson, 2006, p. 23).

It has been common in studies of intolerance to ask respondents which groups of people they do not like and then whether they would allow these people to exercise civil and political rights allowed to his own group, like the organization of rallies and the work in schools and in government (Sullivan and Transue, 1999, p. 631; Inglehart and Norris, 2003, p. 68). Hutchison and

Gibler (2007), for example, operationalized the concept of political tolerance by using questions from the 1995 wave of the World Values Survey that asked respondents whether they thought the people in the group that they considered to be the most threatening to the political and social order should be allowed to hold public office and to participate in public demonstrations. The list of “threatening” groups included criminals and the respondents who have chosen that category were eliminated from the database. Countries that ended with less than 400 respondents were also eliminated from the sample, remaining 33 countries in the database. Building a hierarchical model, with tolerance as the dependent variable, the authors found a strong positive correlation between the index and the country’s involvement in disputes over territory. Controlling for this national level variable and other variables at the individual level, they found no statistically significant correlation between the tolerance index and the duration of democracy or the economic development.

But tolerance should not be limited to the political arena. In fact, the basis of political tolerance can be social. It is in their private life, during everyday events, that individuals have numerous opportunities to exercise tolerance for diversity and thus to form the attitudes and psychic predispositions favorable to political tolerance. Tolerance can have multiple dimensions and be manifested in different circumstances. People that are politically tolerant accept that members of disliked groups hold public positions while the socially tolerant accepts to interact closely with members of disliked groups. However, as noted by Gibson (2006, p. 22), social tolerance and political tolerance are not only conceptually distinct: they are also empirically unassociated. People with high levels of political tolerance are not necessarily socially tolerant.

People tend to create bonds with those among whom they live and be wary with people from other groups. Although living in community is fraught with conflicts, people are not impartial when confronted with a situation where they must judge the actions of members of their own group against the acts of other groups of people. On the contrary, people tend to easily perceive failures or inadequacies of people from other groups and to have greater difficulty in admitting the same problems in their own group. That is, even if cultural differences are minimal, the fact of a population being divided into groups will be sufficient to arouse rivalry or even enmity. As researches in social psychology have shown, the distribution of individuals in different groups causes them to exaggerate the differences between the groups, mitigate internal differences and favor their own group in the allocation of resources (Weldon, 2006, p. 332). Thus it is not an easy task to avoid the emergency of intolerance.

People who feel their safety is under threat look for comfort among the members of their own community, who have similar attitudes. Those people are less tolerant of diversity. It is, thus, expected that those who report being satisfied with their lives are also more socially tolerant.

Sullivan et al. (1981) tested the theory that there is a hierarchy of needs. People would first try to afford their basic necessities before trying to afford less important ones. Sullivan et al. (1981, p. 75) have found that people who miss a comfortable life and feel unsafe were less tolerant than others who were mostly in need of affection, esteem and opportunity to express their originality.

The different needs could be placed in a scale that Sullivan et al. (1981) called “psychological security”, and that resembles the index of survival–self-expression later developed by Inglehart.

There is a distinction between psychological security and perceptions of threat. A person might feel safe even if under threat when she trusts that the society is capable of protecting her, and she can feel unsafe even if not under a clear threat if she does not see this protection as effective (Sullivan et al., 1981). The feeling of insecurity might be the result of threats to the individual or to the community. Anyway, the feeling of insecurity depends not only on existing threats but also on the perception of the power of the group to defend itself (Gibson, 2006, p. 24).

Intolerant people express their intolerance more openly than the tolerant ones do, and they are also more resistant to arguments on how inoffensive other people are than the tolerant are to how dangerous the targets of intolerance are (Peffley and Rohrschneider, 2003, p. 244).

Another factor that can lead to a difference in tolerance to behavior diversity is the relative status of each group (Weldon, 2006, p. 332). In multi-ethnic countries, one would expect differences in the level of tolerance among different ethnic groups. Greater tolerance for people of other ethnicities and with different customs would be economically beneficial because it would make it easier the adaptation of migrants. Talented migrants would be attracted to more intellectualized regions, occupied by open-minded people (Das et al., 2008, p. 193).

Das et al. (2008) created a *global index of tolerance* using a question from the World Values Survey in which respondents are asked to indicate whether “tolerance and respect for others” would be one of the priority values to be taught to children, and three questions that ask respondents to indicate whether they would not like to have among its neighbors “homosexuals”, “people of other races” and “immigrants or foreign workers.” Due to the high correlation between the responses on “people of other races” and “foreign workers”, Das et al. chose to use the average value of these two variables in the construction of the index. The authors then tested and found correlations statistically significant and in the expected direction between the global index of tolerance from 62 countries and several indicators of economic development: higher tolerance is correlated with larger net migration rate, higher number of researchers per million people, and higher income per capita, HDI, and an index of growth competitiveness.

Social class is also an important factor for the explanation of tolerance. Research in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s showed that ordinary citizens felt threatened by groups which they dislike and they were not willing to allow these groups to have the same civil liberties of the majority of the population. Less participatory citizens supported democracy in general, but gave responses that were inconsistent with this support when asked about the rights of specific groups. Support for civil liberties of unpopular groups was considerably higher among community leaders and this would be one reason for the stability of democratic regimes (Sullivan and Transue, 1999, p. 628).

People of middle and upper classes have had the opportunity to live more diverse experiences, travel abroad, and interact with people from other cultures. They also feel their safety less threatened than members of the working class do (Sullivan et al., 1981, p. 94). Manual workers earn low wages, have low education, have more uncertainty about the future, might be unable to

afford basic needs of their children, and all these facts put a strain in family relationships. Even if living a reasonably comfortable life, they still have a standard of life below the average of their society, and have more reasons to be unsatisfied with life and to feel threatened and, consequently, be more hostile toward other groups of people and morally more conservative (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a,b) Andersen and Fetner (2008b) have found that social inequality decreases tolerance to homosexuality in all social classes because it harms interpersonal trust while GDP growth increases tolerance mainly of members of upper classes, especially professionals and managers.

There is a correlation between intolerance to homosexuality and being married with children (Andersen and Fetner, 2008a, p. 314). Parents might be against homosexuality and still accept to interact with homosexual people, but they might be worried that the chances of their children becoming homosexual are higher if they have many opportunities to interact with homosexuals.

The situation worsens if, indeed, there are important cultural differences in relation to what is considered right and wrong for two communities. Each society develops throughout its history its own set of rules that makes it possible a relatively peaceful coexistence among its members. Over the generations, these rules become accepted as natural and different behaviors found in other communities are seen as inappropriate, and historically religion has had an important role in shaping these standardized behaviors.

Religions or at least rationalized religions of the Judeo Christian tradition, are inherently dogmatic. These religions were created by small patriarchal societies surrounded by enemies in a relatively unpopulated world. It is understandable that in these circumstances, women were sexually repressed to guarantee the inheritance of wealth by the legitimate sons of their husbands, and that all sexual behavior not resulting in procreation was condemned as improper for the survival of the community. Judaism, Christianity and Islam ask their followers to have faith in their teachings, which must be accepted as unquestionable truths. Having these truths written in a book (the Bible or the Koran) only makes the free interpretation of the teachings more difficult. The believer must believe in the revealed truth even if not understanding it. If a statement about how the world works and about the proper way to proceed in a certain condition is considered true, all other divergent statements and deviant behaviors can only be guided by misconceptions. Thus, although most religious people preach on non-violence, respect for all human beings, generosity and love, the assumption that the religious knowledge is true and that specific ways of living in society are truly correct logically implies that other people, either following other religion or without religion, live in obscurity and error.

Of course, many people may have a religious affiliation but not dogmatically follow all commands defined by the leaders of their religion and many religious people may view infidels as souls to be saved rather than as enemies to be defeated. These two attitudes and similar others may be sufficient to offset a potentially intolerant behavior.

Islamic countries are among the countries where the influence of religion in people's lives is stronger. Inglehart and Norris use data from 1995–96 and 2000–2002 waves of the World Values Survey to monitor the progress of various values over time, with attention to the differences

between the Western and Islamic countries. While in Western countries younger generations are more progressive than their parents, in Muslim countries younger people are little less conservative than older generations. However, Islam might also be interpreted in a liberal way, compatible with civil liberties. Even when believers think that God's words are infallible and are written in the Koran, they might see men's interpretation of the Koran is fallible and, consequently, theologians would not have the right to say how people have to behave (Mirbagheri, 2002).

The less people recognize the social origin of norms that govern their society, the more they will tend to consider deviant behaviors unacceptable. That is why secular and critical education is more likely to produce tolerant individuals than religious and dogmatic education. People with higher education are acquainted with a more diverse set of ideas and are more capable of thinking abstractly which is a cognitive ability necessary for understanding democratic rules, including the need of tolerance (Sullivan et al., 1981). Those who have access to a secular education will be in contact with a current of thought that cultivates doubt as a way of improving knowledge. At school, students (or at least some of them) learn that the findings must be produced by logical reasoning and based on empirical evidence (Weakliem, 2002, p. 143). Thus, it is expected that individuals of higher education and lower religiosity are more tolerant.

3 The effect of political institutions on tolerance

We have to understand how attitudes change if we want to have a better understanding on how political institutions might affect people's tolerance. People do not make rational choices all the time, nor do they act randomly. Most of the time, a person acts according to a repertoire of actions accumulated over time. People who already have predispositions to act in specific ways in certain circumstances have the propensity to either ignore or reject information that contradicts their predispositions, unless they feel anxious. When there are new circumstances, hardly interpretable as similar to something already experienced, the person feels anxious and do not act promptly, instead reflecting for some time before deciding what to do. Also, if there is a repetition of circumstances that contradicts the predispositions, at some point, the individual might feel the need of a change in her or his attitudes (Marcus et al., 2005; Eckstein, 1988).

Bratton et al. (2005) have found that education, exposition to mass media and personal experience increase cognitive awareness of the surrounding environment. Even people with lower education can observe political events such as elections, see their results, and reach conclusions about the value of democracy. However, when patrimonialism and clientelism predominate, elections might be considered more a signal of the power of leaders to control citizens' votes than an expression of individual freedom. Thus, we might expect that democratic institutions, and particularly the most remarkable one—the elections—have a significant effect on attitudes toward democracy, including social tolerance.

Children and teenagers see their world mostly restricted to family, close friends, school colleagues and people from their own community. They do not have enough autonomy to take

decisions with high impact on their own destinies, such as choosing where to live and where to study. It is only when they turn into adults that national and international events become relevant for some of their most serious decisions. My hypothesis in this paper is that the long term exposure of adults to political institutions will change their attitudes, making them increasingly more democratic.

In a democratic regime, politicians and common citizens alike must accept the results of elections as the legitimate means of choosing who will govern and who will legislate. Those who lose an election must patiently wait until the next election for an opportunity to choose a leaders perceived as better than the incumbent ones and legislators whose values are closer to their own values. There must be a consensus on the rules of the democratic process, and tolerance on divergent political opinions must be part of the consensus.

Bratton (2004); Moehler and Lindberg (2009) have show that alternation in power increases the general satisfaction with democracy, and Bratton (2007) has show that free and fair elections is the factor with the strongest effect on satisfaction with democracy. Andersen and Fetner (2008a) show that tolerance to homosexuality increased within the same age cohort over different waves of the WVS, that is, attitudes change over time and democracy may play a positive role on this change because most politicians want the vote of almost anyone, regardless of the voter's sexual orientation, skin color or other identity characteristics. As argued by Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) people might become more tolerant when living under democracy because they are daily exposed to examples of conflict resolution without physical violence; under democracy, there are elections to win, not enemies to eliminate. Indeed, Inglehart (2003) has shown that tolerance to homosexuality is highly correlated with the level of democratization of countries, and Peffley and Rohrschneider (2003) and Casalecchi (2016) have found that citizens of countries with longer and stronger democracies have more democratic attitudes than citizens of less democratic countries. Looking at an even higher societal level, Hadler (2012) has found evidence of citizens attitudes being more pro-democratic if their countries are members of more international organizations and if there are more international non-governmental organizations' activity in their countries than citizens of other less internationally connected countries. In previous research, I have found that exposure to democratic institutions increase demand for democracy in Africa, Asia and Latin America (Aquino, 2017). Thus, I expect that people exposed for longer time to democratic institutions will also be socially more tolerant than less exposed people since social tolerance is one of the attitudes that underlies democratic rules.

4 Brazil and other Latin American countries

Latin American countries share a history of economic exploitation before and after their political independence. Elites of European origin established highly unequal societies in Latin America, with the descendants of native American and African peoples being forced to work at a low cost to ensure the enrichment of the white elite in the continent and abroad. The scale of enslavement of black people and decimation of native Americans was higher in Brazil than in

other Latin American countries.

Racism and homophobia are serious problems in Brazil. Racism is ubiquitous, though frequently concealed. About half Brazilian population declare to be either black or brown (*pardo*), and this population is disadvantage in many ways. For example, non-whites have lower wages than whites, even when both groups have similar similar jobs, education, and other characteristics that are know to affect wage. According to Augusto et al. (2015), the wage difference decreased from 2002 to 2012, but the proportion of the difference attributable to racism increased. Another example is the homicide rate, which is 15.5 for white people and 36.5 for non-whites (Cerqueira and Moura, 2013). Homophobia is openly manifest by many people and homosexual people seems to be the target of violence more intensely than most other people. When a homosexual person is murdered it is not uncommon the killers to be accused of unusual cruelty (Fernandes, 2013).

Thus, we should expect lower levels of tolerance in Latin America, particularly in Brazil. However, Ribeiro (2010) has analyzed three waves of World Values Survey data from Brazil—years 1991, 1997 and 2006—and has found high proportions of answers indicating tolerance for many questions.

5 Data

The source of data on the dependent variables is the 6th wave (2010–2014) of the World Values Survey (WVS) which administered a battery of questions suitable for measuring social tolerance (World Values Survey, 2016), and I used the V-Dem index of electoral democracy to compute the independent variables of interest regarding exposure to democratic institutions (Coppedge et al., 2016). I deleted from WVS dataset the countries that did not ask the questions used to calculate tolerance indexes, countries not evaluated by the V-Dem project, and countries evaluated as either always or never democratic since its older respondent was 18 years old. I also deleted cases missing either *Age* or *Education*. The remaining dataset has 53,429 respondents from 35 countries. Missing values in other control variables were replaced by random values, in the same proportion of valid values by country.

5.1 Indexes of tolerance

WVS respondents had to say whether they do not want some people as neighbors: drug addicts, people of a different race, people who have AIDS, immigrants or foreign workers, homosexuals, people of a different religion, heavy drinkers, unmarried couples living together, and people who speak a different language.

Principal component analyses reveals that the answers are better interpreted as three dimensions of intolerance: *xenophobia* (dislike of people of different race, religion, language, and country of origin), *sexual conservatism* (distaste for people with AIDS, homosexuals and unmarried couples), and *aversion to drug users* (drug addicts and heavy drinkers). Using these variables, I calculated indexes of tolerance to *Other people*, to *Diversity in sexual behavior* and




Figure 1: Distribution of indexes of tolerance

to *Drug addicts*. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the indexes calculated as the mean value of the answers (0 for mentioned and 1 for not mentioned). The first row of plots represents all 35 countries, and the second includes only data from Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay. Contrary to what I expected, compared with the whole world, Latin America is slightly more tolerant in all three dimensions of tolerance, and—as Ribeiro (2010) has found in other waves of the WVS—Brazil is considerably more tolerant.

5.2 Independent variables

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project evaluated democratic features of most world countries from 1900 to present. One of such features was electoral democracy, which is the best available measure of the presence of formal democratic institutions in countries during the life period of WVS respondents. Using V-Dem’s electoral democracy index, I calculated two variables:

Table 1: Correlations between dependent and independent variables

Independent variable	Region	Tolerance to		
		Others	Sex	Drugs
Years under democracy (adult)	World	0.07	0.17	0.03
	Latin America	-0.03	0.00	0.02
	Brazil	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04
Democratic legacy	World	0.38	0.52	0.30

- *Years under democracy (adult)*: individual level variable calculated as the number of years the responded lived under democracy from when she or he was 18 years old to the year of the survey. I considered democratic the countries with V-Dem's electoral democracy index > 0.5 .
- *Democratic legacy*: country level variable, the mean value of V-Dem's electoral democracy index for the period from 60 years before the survey to the year of the survey.

While *Years under democracy (adult)* measures the effect of exposure to democratic institutions on an individual basis, *Democratic legacy* will be correlated with tolerance if the society as a whole becomes more tolerant, regardless of specific individuals having being exposed more or less than others to democratic institutions.

Table 1 shows the correlations between the tolerance indexes and the independent variables. For *Democratic legacy*, the values of tolerance were averaged by country.

5.3 Control variables

Many factors have been pointed out as having explanatory power on social tolerance, and I will add some of them to the regression models if the WVS has questions suitable to represent these factors and if the questions were asked in all 35 countries kept for this study.

Problematic neighborhood and *Fear of crime* indicate threat to survival due to criminality while *Poverty* (lack of food, medicine and money) is threatening due to material needs. High values for *Income*, *Life satisfaction* and *Post-materialism* indicate the opposite: freedom from material needs, less dependency on the community e, consequently, more tolerance to people of other groups. While high levels of *Education* is indicate cognitive awareness of how social norms are created, and, thus, less fear of people of other groups, *Religiosity* indicates strong adherence to the customs of a specific group and, thus, less room to tolerate different behaviors. *Married people who have children* tend to be less tolerant due to fear of members of disliked groups exerting influence over the children. The literature shows that women are more tolerant than men, at least regarding diversity in sexual behavior, perhaps because they never were unsure about who were the mothers of their children.

Looking at the national level variables, *Crime rate* was calculated averaging answers of WVS respondents, *GDP per capita* data is from the World Bank (2015), and *V-Dem* is V-Dem's electoral index in the year the survey was administered.

6 Results

Table 2 shows the results of three multilevel regression models, one for each dependent variable. The t statistics is shown between parenthesis, and I consider significant results either < -2 or > 2 .

The effect of *Years under democracy (adult)* is significant for both tolerance to other people and tolerance to diversity in sexual behavior. This result corroborates our hypothesis that exposure to democratic institutions increases tolerance. The non significance of the effect on tolerance to drug users is not problematic for our hypothesis because drug traffic—and in some countries drug use—is considered a crime, most people agree with the criminalization of drug traffic, and it is not expected that democracy induces tolerance to unlawful behavior. On the contrary, it is expected that laws are more consonant with citizens values in democratic countries and, thus, that people will more willingly abide to the law in democratic societies.

Democratic legacy has an ambiguous effect on tolerance. On the one hand, it has a positive and significant impact on tolerance toward other people, and a significant and negative impact on tolerance to drug users. These two effects corroborates the hypothesis that exposure to democratic institutions has an effect on the national level. On the other hand, it has a negative, although not significant effect on tolerance toward diversity in sexual behavior, which is against the exposure effect hypothesis.

Regarding the control variables, *V-Dem* is not significant when controlled by *Democratic legacy*. The other control variables mostly have the expected effects.

Table 2: Multilevel regressions: 35 countries

	Others	Sex	Drugs
Years under democracy (adult)	0.055 (4.126)	0.076 (5.627)	-0.011 (-0.717)
Poverty	-0.007 (-12.187)	-0.005 (-7.737)	0.004 (5.301)
Problematic neighborhood	-0.004 (-9.706)	-0.001 (-2.659)	0.001 (1.722)
Fear of crime	0.007 (4.349)	-0.002 (-1.431)	-0.030 (-15.784)
Post-materialism	0.006 (1.496)	0.029 (6.790)	0.031 (6.210)

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	Others	Sex	Drugs
Life satisfaction	0.004 (7.096)	0.003 (5.198)	0.001 (0.851)
Income	-0.035 (-5.312)	0.012 (1.790)	0.016 (2.127)
Religiosity	-0.028 (-3.709)	-0.139 (-18.423)	-0.097 (-11.158)
Age group (Mature)	-0.004 (-1.009)	-0.009 (-2.208)	0.003 (0.555)
Age group (Old)	-0.030 (-5.274)	-0.056 (-9.842)	-0.023 (-3.442)
Sex (Female)	0.004 (1.710)	0.028 (10.910)	-0.025 (-8.669)
Married with children	-0.007 (-2.671)	-0.021 (-7.540)	-0.027 (-8.250)
Education	0.109 (17.911)	0.074 (11.862)	-0.027 (-3.741)
Democratic legacy	4.831 (2.068)	-5.223 (-1.969)	-11.165 (-2.060)
V-Dem	2.445 (1.030)	-2.428 (-0.900)	-5.177 (-0.937)
GDP per capita	-8.198 (-13.569)	9.593 (14.814)	19.266 (18.186)
Crime rate	-4.787 (-2.105)	6.333 (2.453)	12.155 (2.306)
Constant	0.810	-0.047	-0.410

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	Others	Sex	Drugs
	(0.663)	(−0.034)	(−0.144)
Observations	53,374	53,380	53,390
Log Likelihood	−8,940.590	−9,718.123	−17,010.870
Akaike Inf. Crit.	17,921.180	19,476.240	34,061.730
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	18,098.880	19,653.950	34,239.440

Table 3 shows the results of multilevel regressions for the Spanish speaking Latin American countries that remained in the dataset. Because there are so few countries, I left only two national level variables. *Years under democracy (adult)* is not significant for any dependent variable, and *Democratic legacy* is significant for tolerance on drug use, but with an unexpected positive coefficient. *V-Dem* has a positive and significant effect on tolerance toward other people and a negative and significant effect on tolerance to drug use, that is, if we could trust a regression with only 7 cases, we would conclude that the current level of democracy is more relevant for tolerance than the recent history of democratization. In summary, these results might indicate that effect of exposure to democratic institutions on tolerance is not strong enough to be detected in all circumstances.

Table 3: Multilevel regressions: 7 Latin American countries

	Others	Sex	Drugs
Years under democracy (adult)	−0.026 (−0.779)	0.055 (1.431)	−0.049 (−0.877)
Poverty	−0.006 (−5.219)	−0.006 (−4.128)	0.004 (2.273)
Problematic neighborhood	−0.004 (−5.350)	−0.003 (−3.737)	0.001 (0.779)
Fear of crime	0.028 (8.970)	0.014 (3.794)	−0.061 (−11.696)
Post-materialism	−0.018 (−2.210)	−0.002 (−0.215)	0.034 (2.538)
Life satisfaction	0.002	0.003	0.003

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	Others	Sex	Drugs
	(1.746)	(2.070)	(1.453)
Income	−0.043 (−3.273)	−0.016 (−1.059)	−0.038 (−1.736)
Religiosity	−0.016 (−1.055)	−0.106 (−6.198)	−0.111 (−4.527)
Age group (Mature)	−0.004 (−0.388)	−0.018 (−1.703)	0.024 (1.621)
Age group (Old)	−0.027 (−1.979)	−0.084 (−5.261)	0.0004 (0.017)
Sex (Female)	−0.004 (−0.772)	0.019 (3.342)	−0.021 (−2.571)
Married with children	−0.002 (−0.335)	0.003 (0.436)	−0.028 (−3.254)
Education	0.041 (3.298)	0.081 (5.696)	−0.081 (−3.943)
Democratic legacy	−0.641 (−1.283)	−0.005 (−0.008)	1.036 (2.545)
V-Dem	1.076 (2.483)	0.580 (1.142)	−0.881 (−2.501)
Constant	0.415 (1.880)	0.388 (1.499)	0.698 (3.815)
Observations	8,954	8,954	8,954
Log Likelihood	294.771	−950.487	−4,233.487
Akaike Inf. Crit.	−553.541	1,936.974	8,502.974
Bayesian Inf. Crit.	−425.744	2,064.771	8,630.772

Table 4 shows the results of ordinary least square regressions for Brazil alone. In this table, standard errors are between parenthesis, and the asterisks indicate the significance. *Years under democracy (adult)* is not significant, which might be seen as an indicator that the hypothesis of exposure to democratic institutions is favorable to higher tolerance is not effective in all countries. However we should note that the indexes of *Tolerance to people from other groups* and *Tolerance to diversity in sexual behavior* have low variance in Brazil. Indeed, only a few independent variables have significant coefficients in the OLS regressions. That is, we need a different measure of tolerance in Brazil to adequately test any explanatory hypothesis.

Table 4: OLS: Brazil

	Others	Sex	Drugs
Years under democracy (adult)	-0.001 (0.040)	-0.049 (0.057)	0.171 (0.121)
Poverty	-0.004* (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.004 (0.005)
Problematic neighborhood	0.002 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.003 (0.003)
Fear of crime	0.001 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.025* (0.012)
Post-materialism	0.006 (0.009)	0.026* (0.013)	0.021 (0.028)
Life satisfaction	0.0004 (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)	0.005 (0.004)
Income	0.003 (0.014)	0.012 (0.021)	0.081 (0.044)
Religiosity	-0.015 (0.020)	-0.055 (0.028)	-0.122* (0.060)
Age group (Mature)	0.007 (0.012)	0.025 (0.018)	-0.058 (0.038)
Age group (Old)	-0.011	0.012	-0.073

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	Others	Sex	Drugs
	(0.016)	(0.023)	(0.050)
Sex (Female)	−0.003 (0.006)	0.037*** (0.008)	−0.016 (0.018)
Married with children	0.009 (0.006)	0.006 (0.008)	−0.020 (0.018)
Education	0.023 (0.012)	0.053** (0.017)	0.080* (0.037)
Constant	0.950*** (0.021)	0.889*** (0.030)	0.388*** (0.063)
Observations	1,484	1,484	1,484
R ²	0.020	0.034	0.024
Adjusted R ²	0.011	0.025	0.015
Residual Std. Error (df = 1470)	0.106	0.153	0.326
F Statistic (df = 13; 1470)	2.274**	3.955***	2.748***

Note: * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

7 Conclusion

In this paper I tested the effect of exposure to democratic institutions on different dimensions of social tolerance. Using data from the World Values Survey I considered to be tolerant to diversity in sexual behavior the respondents who did not mention unmarried couples, homosexuals and people with AIDS as unwanted neighbors. Those who did not mention people from other race, religion, language or country were classified as tolerant to people from other groups, and those who did not mention drug addicts and heavy drinkers were categorized as tolerant to drug users. Tolerance to diversity in sexual behavior and to people from other groups are consonant with democracy because it is expected that people living under democracy will tolerate the existence of their rivals and seek to live peacefully with them. However, because drug traffic is illegal in most countries, tolerance to drug users might be too merciful for a real democratic society which has legitimate laws that must be obeyed.

I used V-Dem's index of electoral democracy to calculate how many years each respondent has lived under democracy during her or his adult life. The results using WVS data from 35 countries show that exposure to democracy has the expected effect on individuals social toler-

ance: those who have lived more under democracy are more tolerant to people of other groups and to people of diverse sexual behavior. When replicating the models with only 7 Spanish speaking Latin American countries, none of the tolerance indexes was affected by the number of years respondents have lived under democracy, and the variable was not significant for Brazil alone too. We have to consider, however, that the indexes of tolerance has a low variance in Latin American countries.

I also calculated the mean value of V-Dem's index in the last 60 years to test whether exposure to democracy has an effect on the national society as whole, but I have found only limited support for this hypothesis.

Overall, the results show that at the individual level exposure to democratic institutions have a modest effect on social tolerance, at least in some regional contexts. Although not outstanding, the results corroborate the finding that exposure to democratic institutions increases demand for democracy, and, thus, contribute for an optimistic vision of the future of democracy.

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